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Abstract 
This paper investigates the link between external financing and product market competition by focusing on different 
maturity structures. Using firm-level data for Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995, we find that 
long-term loans enable firms to compete aggressively at a level below profit maximization. By contrast, short-term 
loans are not related to product market competition. Our results suggest that long-term loans play an important role in 
investment in market share for long-term profits through lowering prices.
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Analysis of the link between credit market imperfection and pricing strategy occupies an 
important role in macroeconomics, industrial organization, corporate finance, and other fields 
(e.g., Phillips (1995), Chevalier (1995a), Chevalier (1995b), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), 
and Asplund et al. (2005)). Asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers create a 
gap between the costs of external and internal financing. Costly external financing restricts 
the ability of firms to raise external finance. Firms that have the difficulty in raising external 
finance need to boost current profits to meet their liabilities and to finance their operations. 
This leads the firms to gain short-term profits by raising prices. In particular, a formal model 
presented in Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)  suggests that if price level maximizing the 
present  value  of  future  profits  is  below  the  short-term  profit  maximization  price  level, 
liquidity-constrained firms could increase their profits in the short run by raising prices in 
markets with switching costs. 
In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  link  between  external  financing  and  product  market 
competition.  Firms  facing  the  difficulty  in  obtaining  external  finance  are  likely  to  place 
greater importance on current profits relative to future profits to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. 
However, obtaining external finance enables the firms to avoid imminent bankruptcy. Firms 
receiving external funds need not put greater emphasis on current cash flows than previously, 
and attempt to reap long-term profits from investment in future market share if the firms have 
strong incentives to increase market share. This leads firms to maintain prices at a lower level 
than firms without such funds. Thus, our prediction is that firms receiving external funds 
maintain smaller price-cost margins than other firms by cutting prices. In particular, we focus 
on different maturity structures of external funds because these could have different effects on 
product market competition. 
We examine the prediction by using panel data on Japanese firms.
1  There is main reason 
why Japanese firms are suitable to testing our hypothesis. Our hypothesis is consistent with 
the notion that Japanese firms aim to maximize market share rather than profits.
2  Abegglen 
and  Stalk  (1985),  for  example ,  present  survey  results  showing  that  Japanese  managers 
consider acquisition of market share to be the most important objective  of the firm. Blinder 
(1991) argues that Japanese managers are concerned with growth, not profits, because of the 
lack of disciplinary pressure by shareholders. Abe (1997)  finds that long-term performance 
                                                   
1  See Porter and Sakakibara (2004) for the review of the literatures on market competition in Japan. 
2  Kaplan (1994) is skeptical about this view. He presents evidence that the response of executive 
turnover to performance variables in Japan is similar to that in the United States, and concludes that 
this is inconsistent with the view that Japanese managers ignore profits to pursue increases in market 
share or sales growth. 2 
 
measures are more sensitive to executive turnover in Japan than short-term measures. Thus, 
using  data  on  Japanese  firm  allows  us  to  examine  whether  external  funds  affect  product 
market competition. 
Our empirical results show that when firms receive long-term loans, the firms compete 
more fiercely at a level below the profit maximizing level. By contrast, short-term loans do 
not  affect  product  market  competition.  Consequently,  our  findings  suggest  that  long-term 
loans  play  an important role in investment  in  market  share for long-term profits  through 
lowering prices. 
Our study is related to Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) that find that keiretsu group firms are 
induced to have lower price-cost margins by main bank pressures to use capital and raise 
output more, but is different from this previous study in two ways. First, we explicitly attempt 
to shed light on the impact of change in loans on product market competition, with special 
attention to different maturity structures. Second, in contrast to the cross-section analyses in 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), we use panel data of individual firms. Using panel dataset is well 
suited  to  examining  determinants  of  price-cost  margins.  Moreover,  our  study  is  strongly 
associated with those of Erol (2003, 2005) that present evidence that while short-term debt 
increases output price, long-term debt has a negative impact. However, our study differs from 
two previous studies in two ways. First, while the two studies use industry-level data from 
Turkey, developing country, our analyses are based on firm-level data for Japanese firms in an 
advanced economy. Second, the two studies use the ratio of bank loans to total assets by 
focusing on the role of loans as debt. By contrast, we concentrate on the role of overall loans, 
including bank loans, loans from other financial institutions and affiliated firms and so on, 
and use the change rate of loans over the previous year in empirical analyses. Using the 
change rate of loans over the previous year is essential to examining our prediction. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical framework 
and variables. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
 
Our purpose is to examine whether external funds allows firms to compete more fiercely. 
Then we test directly at the firm-level for the effects of change in loans on product market 
competition.  In  what  follows,  we  derive  price-cost  margins  based  on  firm's  profit 
maximization behaviors, and add loan and control variables to the structural equation for our 
purpose. 
To derive the structural equation, we follow earlier work by Weinstein and Yafeh (1995). 
Although they propose several models to examine whether firms belonging to keiretsu groups 3 
 
collude or compete aggressively among the same group, our structural equation corresponds 
to  their  simple  type  of  Cournot  competition.  The  model  reflects  well  the  fact  that  most 
Japanese firms operate in many markets. 
Assuming that each firm with Cobb-Douglas technology maximizes total profits in each 
market on the basis of Cournot competition, we obtain the following equation: 
                           PCMi =   βj˃ijSHRij j                                                      
where  PCMi  is firm i’s production-weighted price-cost margin,  ˃ij  is the share of firm i’s 
total sales in industry j,  SHRij  is firm i’s market share in industry j, and  βj  is a constant for 
each industry j. 
Allowing  for  the  impact  of  loan  and  control  variables  on  the  price-cost  margin,  the 
equation to be estimated is then written as 
                  PCMit =   βj˃ijtSHRijt + γ1LOANit−1 + γ2CONTROLit−1 + ʵit j                 
where  PCMit  is firm i’s production-weighted price-cost margin in year t,  ˃ijt  is the share of 
firm i’s total sales in industry j in year t,  SHRijt  is firm i’s market share in industry j in year t,   
βj,  γ1,  γ2  are a set of estimated parameters,  LOANit  is a set of loan variables for firm i in year 
t,  CONTROLit is a set of control variables for firm i, i is the firm subscript, j is the industry 
subscript, t is the year subscript, and  ʵit is the error term that reflects all other shocks to the 
firm's price-cost margin. 
Our  data  is  obtained  from  the  Nikkei  NEEDS  dataset.  This  dataset  includes 
unconsolidated data on income statements and balance sheets for non-financial firms traded 
on the stock exchange. We employ a sample limited to manufacturing firms with fiscal years 
ending in March over the period 1990-1995. We do not include firms that drop from our 
sample during the sample period because of mergers, and acquisitions (M&A) or bankruptcy. 
As a result, our sample includes 1014 Japanese manufacturing firms. This study is based on 
the  sample  period  because  the  market  for  M＆A  has  increased  since  the  late  1990s,  and 
Japanese managers are forced to emphasize stock price rather than market share. Thus, using 
data in the early 1990s is suitable for an examination of our hypothesis. 
To calculate the variable for price-cost margin, we need to know the marginal cost for 
each firm, but such data are not available. Instead, we follow previous work by Weinstein and 
Yafeh (1995), and approximate marginal cost by using the cost of sales for each firm. Then 
our price-cost margin is defined as follows: 
Price − cost margin =
Sales − Cost of Sales
Sales
 
where  cost  of  sales  is  labor  costs  plus  raw  material  costs  plus  the  processing  costs  of 
outsourcing plus depreciation allowance plus inventory value at the beginning of the period 
minus inventory value at the end of the period. 4 
 
We use data from Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha's Japan Company Handbook to calculate the 
share of firm's sales in each industry (˃ijt). Although Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) use Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun Sha's Japan Company Handbook, there is no difference in the share of firm's 
sales in each industry between these alternative sources of information. The data are based on 
three-digit  industry  classifications,  but  we  aggregate  at  the  two-digit  level  to  avoid  the 
excessively large number of coefficients to be estimated at the three-digit level.
3  Using data 
on aggregate sales  at the two-digit level from the Census of Manufacturing enables us to 
construct the market share for every firm in each industry (SHRijt). 
LOAN contains a set of variables that are intended to capture the effects of change in 
loans  as  external  funds.  We  calculate  the  change  rate  of  loans  over  the  previous  year  to 
examine the effects of loans on the price-cost margin. Total loan growth is the change rate of 
total loans outstanding over the previous year. The effects of loans on price-cost margin could 
vary depending on different maturity structures of the loans. Then, we classify total loans into 
long- and short-term loans, and construct separate variables for them. Long-term loan growth 
is the change rate of long-term loans outstanding over the previous year. Short-term loan 
growth is the change rate of short-term loans outstanding over the previous year.
4 
CONTROL contains a set of variables that are intended to capture other characteristics, 
including internal funds, keiretsu group membership, firm size, capital intensity, dependence 
on loans. Cash flow ratio is intended to capture the extent of internal funds. This is defined as 
after-tax  income  plus  deprec iation  allowance  less  dividends ,  divided  by  total  assets . 
Following Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), we incl ude keiretsu group membership that has  a 
value of 1 if the firm is in one of the eight bank-centered keiretsu groups (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-ichi Kangyo, Sanwa, IBJ, and Tokai) , and 0 otherwise.  Our sample 
includes 362 keiretsu group firms.  Identification of keiretsu group membership comes from 
Industrial Groupings in Japan. Firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. As in 
Domowitz et al. (1986) and Fisher (1987), we include the variable for capital intensity. This 
variable is defined as depreciable assets, divided by sales. We include variables that control 
for the degree of dependence on three types of loans. Total loan ratio is defined as total loans 
outstanding,  divided  by  total  assets.  Long-term  loan  ratio  is  defined  as  long-term  loans 
outstanding,  divided  by  total  assets.  Short-term  loan  ratio  is  defined  as  short-term  loans 
outstanding,  divided  by  total  assets.  While  Long-term  loan  growth  and  Short-term  loan 
                                                   
3  Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) also use market share variables at the two-digit industry level because 
of more than 200 coefficients required for their specifications at the three-digit industry level. 
4  Our sample includes several firms without loans outstanding in the years. In particular, we could not 
calculate the change rate of loans outstanding for firms with no loans outstanding in the previous year 
but with loans outstanding in the current year. Then we assume that the change rate for such firms is 0. 
Our results hold even when we make no such assumption, or set the change rate to other value, for 
example, 1. 5 
 
growth are intended to capture the effects of loans as flow variables, Long-term loan ratio and 
Short-term loan ratio are intended to control for the degrees of dependence on loans. Because 
the effects of the change rate of loans on price-cost margin should vary with the degrees of 
dependence on loans, inclusion of both two variables in our specification is important for 
examination of our prediction. 
Table  1  reports  the  means,  medians,  and  standard  deviations  for  variables  except  for 
market share variables. Note that observations with extreme values for continuous variables 
are removed from our sample to ensure the robustness of our results.
5 
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
In the empirical analyses, we examine the impact of change in loans on product market 
competition, using data on Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995. Our 
sample includes 16 manufacturing industries according to two-digit industry classifications.   
As mentioned above, we use cost of sales instead of marginal cost data. Unfortunately, the 
difference between accounting cost and true marginal cost could cause errors in the estimation. 
Indeed,  Fisher  (1987)  demonstrates  that  the  difference  is  highly  correlated  with  several 
independent  variables,  including  firm-  and  industry-specific  attributes.
6  To overcome this 
problem, Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) add the share of firm's sales in each industry  (˃ijt) to 
their specifications. However, they argue that a high degree of multicollinearity between  ˃ijt 
and  ˃ijt・SHRijt  make  it  difficult  to  estimate  the  coefficients  on  βj.  For  this  reason,  we 
employ industry dummy variables.
7  As in Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), these variables help 
control for industry-specific effects, such as degree of market concentration, industry growth 
rate, import penetration and so on.   
As suggested by Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), when costs are imperf ectly measured, 
market share variables could be correlated with the error term, resulting in biased coefficients. 
Then, we follow Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), and treat the firm's market share ( SHRijt) as 
endogenous. The instrumental variable for market share is the ratio of each firm's employment 
in the sector to total employment of the sector. To treat the firm's market share as endogenous, 
we  estimate  the  equation,  using  two-stage  least  squares.  In  the  examination  of  the 
determinants  of  mark-up,  several  studies  use  panel  data  models  that  focus  on  the 
                                                   
5  Extreme observations here are defined as those for which any one of the variables has a value that is 
more than four standard deviations from its mean value. 
6  Salinger (1990) disputes Fisher’s (1987) claim that accounting measures of return on sales are 
flawed because of mismeasurement of economic depreciation. He argues that errors in measuring 
depreciation adversely affect only the numerator in return on sales, and the impact is weak. 
7  We obtain similar results when  ˃ijt  is included in our specifications. 6 
 
heterogeneity across firms (e.g., Domowitz et al. (1986) and Campello (2003)). However, 
using  panel  data  analyses,  in  particular  fixed  effects  model  as  estimation  method  in  our 
analyses generates difficult problems. If the fixed effects model is employed as estimation 
method, the effects captured by market share and keiretsu group membership are cancelled 
out because these variables remain stable during our sample periods. Given that firm sales in 
each  industry  reflect  differences  in  production  costs  for  each  firm,  we  believe  that 
firm-specific effects are captured by market share for each firm. 
Table  2  provides  evidence  for  the  link  between  change  in  loans  and  product  market 
competition.  To  avoid  endogeneity  problems,  one  period  lagged  values  of  independent 
variables  excluding  market  share  variables  are  included  in  our  equations.  All  equations 
include  industry  dummy  variables  and  year  dummy  variables.  Because  observations  with 
extreme  values  are  removed  from  our  sample,  the  number  of  observation  varies  with 
specifications. Because there are 22 coefficients for  βj, we do not report the coefficients in 
order to conserve the space. In all regressions, nearly half coefficients for  βj  are positive, but 
few of them are statistically significant. Column 1 contains the results for the specification 
with total loan growth. The coefficient on total loan growth is negative, but not statistically 
significant. Significant and negative coefficient on cash flow ratio indicates that firms with 
lower internal funds increase profit margins by raising prices. Consistent with the findings 
reported by bank influence model in Weinstein and Yafeh (1995), the coefficient on keiretsu 
group  membership  is  negative  and  statistically  significant,  suggesting  that  keiretsu  group 
firms are compelled to have lower price-cost margins from main bank pressures. Significant 
and positive coefficient on firm size indicates that larger firms have higher price-cost margins. 
The coefficient on capital intensity is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that 
firms with higher capital intensity have lower profit margins. The coefficient on total loan 
ratio is positive, but not statistically significant.   
By focusing on different maturity structures of the loans, Column 2 contains the results for 
the specification with long-term loan growth and short-term loan growth. Long-term loan 
growth has a statistically significant and negative coefficient.
8  Long-term loans enable firms 
to  compete  fiercely  below  the  profit  m aximizing  level  by  lowering  their  prices.  Such 
aggressive competition leads to an increase in market share as long-term profits. By contrast, 
                                                   
8  If  the  error  term  is  serially  correlated,  Long-term  loan  growth  and  Short-term  loan  growth  are 
correlated with the error term, thereby generating endogeneity problems. Unfortunately, we have no 
instrumental variables available for examination of the robustness check of our results. However, our 
error term could contain the effect of business fixed investment. If the firms try to invest, they need to 
raise long-term loans from other institutions. Information about business fixed investment in the error 
term are positively correlated with Long-term loan growth, suggesting that the estimated coefficient 
suffers from upward bias. Consequently, we are not able to control for endogeneity problems fully, but 
our results remain unchanged even if the problems occur. 7 
 
the coefficient on short-term loan growth is negative, but statistically insignificant. We infer 
from these results that in column 1, the change rate of total loans over the previous year does 
not  affect  price-cost  margins  because  different  effects  of  long-  and  short-term  loans  on 
price-cost  margins offset  each other.  Long-term loan ratio has  a positive, but  statistically 
insignificant coefficient. Short-term loan ratio has a negative, but statistically insignificant 
coefficient. Results for other variables remain virtually unchanged. 
The different effects of long-term loan growth and short-term loan growth indicate that the 
maturity  periods  of  the  loans  are  important  for  product  market  competition.  If  additional 
profits generated by increased market share are required to cover debt, whether the profits 
during  the  short-term  periods  are  sufficient  to  meet  liabilities  is  a  difficult  problem.  In 
addition, firms receiving short-term loans may require creditors to roll over short-term loans 
subsequently, but are likely to face the credit crunch. Alternatively, provision of long-term 
loans  allows  firms  to  avoid  such  risk.  Thus,  long-term  loans  play  an  important  role  in 
aggressive competition that is intended to increase long-term profits.   
The results in Table 2 indicate that long-term loans allow firms to have lower price-cost 
margins,  or  to  compete  fiercely  below  the  profit  maximizing  level.  This  indicates  that 
long-term  loans  as  external  finance  play  an  essential  role  in  aggressive  competition  by 
lowering prices, or increasing output. Taking account of the fact that Japanese firms operate in 
many industries, firms receiving long-term loans may lower prices in industries with high 




In this paper, we examine the link between external funds and product market competition. 
In particular, we focus attention on different maturity structures of the loans. Using data on 
Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995, we investigate the impact of loan 
financing on product market competition.   
We find that firms receiving long-term loans compete more aggressively at a level beyond 
that  warranted  by  profit  maximization.  Alternatively,  short-term  loans  do  not  have  such 
impact on product market competition. As a result, we conclude that long-term loans play an 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. dev. 
Price-cost margin  0.4218  0.3906  0.2056 
Total loan growth  0.2094  0  3.3516 
Long-term loan growth  0.3147  0  3.7455 
Short-term loan growth  0.1359  0  2.2241 
Cash flow ratio  0.0433  0.0424  0.0340 
Keiretsu group membership  0.3631     
Firm size  10.8509  10.6941  1.3346 
Capital intensity  0.2287  0.1977  0.1349 
Total loan ratio  0.1808  0.1416  0.1673 
Long-term loan ratio  0.0799  0.0459  0.0955 
Short-term loan ratio  0.0977  0.0714  0.0991 
                      Notes 
              The  table  reports  the  means,  medians  and  standard  deviations  of  the  variables  for  1014 
Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995. Price-cost margin is sales less cost 
of sales, divided by sales. Total loan growth is the change rate of total loans outstanding over 
the previous year. Long-term loan growth is the change rate of long-term loans outstanding 
over  the  previous  year.  Short-term  loan  growth  is  the  change  rate  of  short-term  loans 
outstanding  over the previous  year. Cash  flow  ratio is  after-tax income plus  depreciation 
allowance less dividends, divided by total assets. Keiretsu group membership has a value of 1 
if the firm  is  in  one of  bank-centered  keiretsu groups, and 0 otherwise. Firm  size is the 
logarithm of total assets. Capital intensity is depreciable assets, divided by sales. Total loan 
ratio is the ratio of total loans outstanding to total assets. Long-term loan ratio is the ratio of 
long-term loans outstanding to total assets. Short-term loan ratio is the ratio of short-term 












Table 2. Corporate financing and product market competition 
  Dependent variable: Price-cost margin 
Independent variable  1  2 
Total loan growtht−1  －0.0003   
  (0.0017)   
Long − term loan growtht−1    －0.0014** 
    (0.0006) 
Short − term loan growtht−1    －0.0002 
    (0.0007) 
Cash flow ratiot−1  －0.1563*  －0.1731* 
  (0.0850)  (0.0846) 
Keiretsu group membershipt−1  －0.0194***  －0.0183*** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0052) 
Firm sizet−1  0.0213***  0.0215*** 
  (0.0032)  (0.0032) 
Capital intensityt−1  －0.2321***  －0.2352*** 
  (0.0222)  (0.0223) 
Total loan ratiot−1  0.0074   
  (0.0195)   
Long − term loan ratiot−1    0.0485 
    (0.0331) 
Short − term loan ratiot−1    －0.0333 
    (0.0323) 
No. of observations  4824  4796 
𝑅2  0.3632  0.3649 
Notes 
The table reports regression estimates for 1014 Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 
1990-1995.  All  equations  include  a  constant,  market  share  variables,  industry  dummy 
variables, and year dummy variables. The coefficients are estimated, using two-stage least 
squares.  Standard  errors  reported  in  parentheses  are  robust  to  heteroskedasticity. 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level. 
 
 